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Séminaire du GERAD

Technological choice in an evolutionary oligopoly game

jeudi 31 octobre 2019 de 11 h à 12 h

Fabio Lamentia – Universitá della Calabria, Italie

Résumé
« We propose and analyze a two-stage oligopoly game in which firms first simultaneously choose production technologies and in the second stage simultaneously choose production quantities. After characterizing the Nash equilibrium of the game, we cast our static model in a dynamic setting exploring the stability properties of the market equilibrium in two different cases: (i) exogenous technology distribution and Cournot adjustments; (ii) endogenous technology distribution in an infinite population game with Cournot-Nash equilibrium outputs. The main aim of the paper is that of extending the results about Cournot oligopoly stability in an evolutionary setting of heterogeneous decreasing returns-to-scale technologies. We show how the interplay between production decisions and R&D decisions can generate endogenous market fluctuations leading to complex dynamic phenomena. »

Présenté conjointement par la Chaire de théorie des jeux et gestion et le GERAD.

Entrée gratuite. Bienvenue à tous!

Lieu : Université de Montréal, Pavillon André-Aisenstadt, Salle 4488



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