Le contenu

Pierre Chaigneau

Associate Professor,  Department of Finance


Pierre Chaigneau

Contact information

HEC Montréal
3000, chemin de la Côte-Sainte-Catherine
Montréal (Québec)
Canada H3T 2A7

Email: pierre.chaigneau@hec.ca
Phone: 514 340-5661
Secretary: 514 340-6823
Fax: 514 340-5632
Office: 4.232

Personal page

Education

  • Diplôme de grande école (MSc in Management), HEC Paris
  • DEA du Delta (MSc in Economics), EHESS
  • PhD in Finance, London School of Economics

Expertise

  • Corporate Finance
  • Agency Theory
  • CEO pay
  • Financial Economics

Current research

My current research focuses on corporate governance and the optimal structure of executive pay in a principal-agent framework on the one hand, and on the application of global games techniques to model rollover risk and illiquidity on the other hand.

+

Journal articles (11)


CHAIGNEAU, Pierre, EDMANS, Alex, GOTTLIEB, Daniel; « Does improved information improve incentives? », Journal of Financial Economics, 2019 (status : in press).

CHAIGNEAU, Pierre; « The optimal timing of CEO compensation », Finance Research Letters, vol. 24, 2018, p. 90-94.

CHAIGNEAU, Pierre, SAHUGUET, Nicolas; « The Effect of Monitoring on CEO Compensation in a Matching Equilibrium », Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, vol. 53, no 3, 2018, p. 1297-1339.

CHAIGNEAU, Pierre; « Managerial Compensation and Firm Value in the Presence of Socially Responsible Investors », Journal of Business Ethics, vol. 149, no 3, 2018, p. 747-768.

CHAIGNEAU, Pierre, SAHUGUET, Nicolas, SINCLAIR-DESGAGNÉ, Bernard; « Prudence and the convexity of compensation contracts », Economics Letters, vol. 157, 2017, p. 14-16.

CHAIGNEAU, Pierre; « Risk aversion, prudence, and compensation », European Journal of Finance, vol. 21, no 15, 2015, p. 1357-1373.

CHAIGNEAU, Pierre; « AVERSION TO THE VARIABILITY OF PAY AND THE STRUCTURE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION CONTRACTS », Journal of Business Economics and Management, vol. 16, no 4, 2015, p. 712-732.

BOUVARD, Matthieu, CHAIGNEAU, Pierre, DE MOTTA, Adolfo; « Transparency in the Financial System: Rollover Risk and Crises », Journal of Finance, vol. 70, no 4, Août 2015, p. 1805-1837.

CHAIGNEAU, Pierre; « Explaining the Structure of CEO Incentive Pay with Decreasing Relative Risk Aversion », Journal of Economics and Business, Vol. 67, Mai-juin 2013, p. 4-23.

CHAIGNEAU, Pierre; « Risk-shifting and the regulation of bank CEOs' compensation », Journal of Financial Stability, vol. 9, no 4, Décembre 2013, p. 778-789.

CHAIGNEAU, Pierre; « Expliquer et contenir la prise de risque excessive des banques », L'actualité économique, Vol. 89, no 2, Juin 2013, p. 147-151.



This selection of supervision activities covers the last five years.

+

Supervised project supervision – MSc in Management (6)

In codirection with : BOYER, Martin
Aversion pour le risque et excès de confiance en contexte de sélection adverse: leurs manifestations et impacts sur les polices d'assurance automobile et les réclamations , by Julie Salomon
September 2016

Sensibilité aux taux d'intérêt des placements en infrastructures dans un contexte d'investissement guidé par le passif , by Morgane Rame
March 2016

L'évaluation de la performance des fonds de couverture , by Ismael Traore
October 2015

Profitability Analysis for Credit Unions in United States and Their Growing Opportunities , by Ledeenne Chapleau
March 2013

Comment améliorer l'efficience des techniques traditionnelles du contrôle de gestion à l'aide des outils de la finance de marché , by Thomas Rémi Baillet
January 2013

HFHI: MicroBuild Fund Pipeline , by Chanel Damphousse
June 2012


hec.ca > Faculty