Le contenu

A HEC Foundation, Chair in Game Theory and Management and GERAD Seminar – Competition for the access to and use of information in networks

March 27, 2017 from 11:00 to 12:00

Agnieszka Rusinowska – Université Paris 1, France

In a network formation framework, where payoffs reflect an agent's ability to access information from direct and indirect contacts, we integrate negative externalities due to connectivity associated with two types of effects: competition for the access to information, and rivalrous use of information. We consider two separate models to capture the first and the second situations, respectively. In the first model we assume that information is a non-rivalrous good but that there is competition for the access to information, for example because an agent with many contacts must share his time between them and thus has fewer opportunities to pass on information to each particular contact. In the second model we assume that there is not competition for the access to information but that the use of information is rivalrous. In this case, it is assumed that when people receive the information before me, the harmful effect is greater than when others receive the information at the same time as myself. Our results concern pairwise stability and efficiency in both models and allow us to compare and contrast the effects of two kinds of competition for information.

This seminar is a joint presentation of the HEC Foundation, the Chair in Game Theory and Management and the Group for Research in Decision Analysis (GERAD). .
Free entrance. Welcome to everyone!


André-Aisenstadt Building
Université de Montréal Campus
2920, chemin de la Tour
Montréal QC H3T 1J4
Université de Montréal
Room 4488

hec.ca > Events